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4Merton and Bodie [1992] illustrate that even when risky assets are subject to a guarantee (like deposit insurance), the moral hazard problem can be effectively controlled if efficient estimates of market value are available. The illustration is based on the system stockbrokers employ to handle customers' margin accounts. When an investor opens a margin account with a broker and borrows money to buy stocks or bonds, the broker effectively becomes a loan guarantor. However, even though margin accounts are established without extensive credit checks and even though such accounts can include highly volatile assets, the guarantee exposes the brokerage house to relatively little risk. As a result, the margin system functions with no special fee and low interest rates (typically substantially less than the prime rate). Brokers can provide an effective and low-cost guarantee because they set and monitor capital margins which are calculated in terms of the market value of the investor's securities. This same type of monitoring and seizure system is used by futures and options exchanges worldwide to protect the exchanges against losses from contract defaults by customers.
estimates of value (as measured by stock prices) than the historical-cost book values produced in the United States. Evidence discussed in section 8 suggests that a combination of mark-to-market accounting and rigid regulatory intervention policies has led to low costs of resolving Danish bank failures.
Some implications of the Danish experience are summarized in section 9. While the Danish experience provides useful evidence on several issues regarding the desirability of implementing mark-to-market accounting in the U.S., two qualifications remain. First, in evaluating the relevance of the Danish evidence for the United States, one must take into account the vast differences between the two countries, including the number of banking institutions, political issues, the nature of investments, and the auditing and regulatory environments. Second, Denmark has both mark-to-market accounting and a rigid regulatory intervention system; the implementation of mark-to-market accounting in the United States may not be as effective as in Denmark, absent a change in regulatory intervention procedures. Moreover, given the U.S. history of regulatory forbearance for both thrifts and banks, there is cause to question whether an aggressive intervention policy would be tolerated. Subject to these caveats, the evidence reported in this study supports the use of mark-to-market accounting for financial institutions. The study also illustrates an approach for evaluating the effectiveness of mark-tomarket accounting, should such a system be adopted in the U.S.
Implementing Mark-to-Market Accounting
Bank capital-adequacy regulations in the United States have traditionally relied on historical-cost accounting measures. Some adjustments recognize changes in the market values of assets or liabilities, but they fall short of eliminating the gap between book values and market values. The remaining gap stems primarily from four causes: (1) failure to recognize changes in the values of long-term investments and loans resulting from changes in interest rates; (2) delays in recognizing value decreases from increased credit risk; (3) failure to recognize changes in the values of liabilities; and (4) failure to recognize changes in the value of intangible assets, such as the so-called core-deposit premium.5 Comprehensive mark-to-market accounting seeks to eliminate these gaps, but must address several challenges, as discussed below. 5 The core deposit premium derives from the banks' ability to raise funds from "core" depositors who are less interest-sensitive than those in, say, the market for brokered deposits. The willingness of core depositors to forego fully competitive interest rates should be based on the value of associated services rendered by the bank (such as free checking services, convenience in making withdrawals, or advantages in borrowing). Thus, if the core-deposit premium for a given bank constitutes an intangible asset, it must reflect the ability of the bank to provide such services at low cost. Estimation Errors. Market prices are not readily available for traditional bank assets and liabilities, including "middle-market" business loans, commercial real-estate loans, and some sovereign debt. Estimates of exit values for these assets are thus subject to significant errors. If the errors overstate values, the insurer will not intervene as quickly as it should, and the proceeds realized from seizure will be less than expected. If the errors understate the values, solvent banks will be seized and liquidated. This suggests that the valuation procedures should be symmetric and, hence, unbiased (see Merton and Bodie [1993] ).
Because of the natural tension between banks and insurers over asset valuation, an effective mark-to-market system should constrain the opportunities for manipulation by using procedures that are known, agreed upon by both parties in advance, and difficult to manipulate. That is, an efficient mark-to-market system is one that, specified ex ante, gives the best estimate of the price at which an asset could be sold, using verifiable information.
Private Information. Even when market prices exist, they may not reflect the bank's private information. Such private information could also be used to improve the accuracy of estimated market prices, provided the information can be (confidentially) verified by an independent auditor. However, bank managers' incentives typically favor upward-biased estimates of asset values and downward-biased estimates of liabilities. It is, therefore, sometimes optimal to neglect banks' private information if doing otherwise creates opportunities for too much manipulation.
Illiquidity. Many traditional bank assets are illiquid, as evidence by large bid-ask price spreads, raising the question of what the appropriate price is for marking such assets to market. As long as assets are marked to market at the bid price (i.e., orderly liquidation price), the illiquidity of an asset serving as collateral is not a problem for the insurer. However, illiquid assets make a bank vulnerable to seizure when the bid price falls. If this risk is sufficiently large and the chances of a violation are not negligible, it is inefficient for such assets to be treated as collateral in the deposit insurance system; they would be held more efficiently elsewhere.
Comprehensiveness. One important practical question is whether markto-market accounting should include liabilities and intangible assets. If assets are marked to market, but liabilities are not, net worth estimates will be distorted in a way that reduces incentives to hedge assets with liabilities, even though such hedging would reduce the bank's economic exposure.
In principle, intangible assets like goodwill and core-deposit premia could be included in regulatory net worth if these assets can be preserved in liquidation or sale, and if their value can be reasonably estimated. However, if such estimates are too vulnerable to manipulation and error, it may be more efficient to ignore them; effectively, this would preclude the use of such intangibles as collateral to insured deposits. Reliability and Volatility. Some argue that a market-value system might not produce more information than the current U.S. system that combines historical costs with footnote disclosures about interest rate and credit risk (Beaver, Datar, and Wolfson [1992] ). That is, managers may be able to manipulate reported market values so that they are no more or even less informative than a combination of other more readily auditable disclosures. Of course, mark-to-market accounting could be required while preserving the existing set of readily auditable disclosures (such as data on nonperforming loans) that would permit outsiders to assess the reasonableness of the market-value estimates. Such a system would at least weakly dominate the current one in terms of the amount of information disclosed, though it would impose additional accounting costs on the banks.
Another complaint is that mark-to-market accounting produces volatile earnings and capital values (e.g., American Bankers' Association [1990] ). Although proponents of mark-to-market accounting would counter that real economic volatility should be recognized, excessive volatility arising from measurement error in market-value estimates could lead to more frequent capital requirement violations, and hence premature interventions.6 Seidman [1991] claims that the mere act of intervention can destroy value up to 10-15% of assets. Seidman asserts that the loss arises from an erosion of the bank's intangible franchise value, and because (given their information disadvantage) purchasers require a discount even on good loans.7
As this discussion shows, the debate about the actual costs and benefits of implementing mark-to-market accounting for regulatory purposes is difficult to settle without empirical evidence. For example, the issue of measurement error raises questions about the extent to which a mark-to-market system is subject to manipulation. Similarly, the issue of volatility raises questions about, among other things, the effect of markto-market accounting on the frequency of regulatory capital violations and the benefits of tying capital requirements directly to market-valuebased equity ratios.
To obtain evidence on the effects of direct reliance on market-valuebased capital requirements, we turn to the experience of Denmark, which has long tied bank and savings bank regulatory capital requirements to a market-value accounting system. The same accounting system is used in Denmark for regulatory reporting and financial reporting to shareholders, allowing outsiders to monitor both bank managers and 6 Alternatively, to avoid violations, banks will be forced to hold higher levels of capital. Through 1990, the Supervisory Authority required that bank capital (including stock, retained earnings, and subordinated debt) be at least 8% of total liabilities (equivalent to 7.4% of total assets).9 Beginning in 1991, Danish banks were required to comply with the risk-based capital requirements to be adopted by the European Economic Community under the auspices of the Bank for International Settlements (BIS). For most banks, the BIS standards allow lower levels of capital than previously required in Denmark.
Verification
When a bank's or savings bank's capital falls below the required level at the end of any quarter, the Supervisory Authority allows six months for the institution to raise new equity or otherwise satisfy the capital requirement.10 New bank equity in Denmark is typically raised through a rights offering to current shareholders, usually at a discount. If at the end of the six months the bank is still not in compliance, the Supervisory Authority immediately places the bank under new control, generally by arranging an acquisition by a healthy bank. In this process, the Supervisory Authority serves as a merger broker, identifying a willing acquirer in advance, so that the change of control can occur quickly and with little publicity. In two cases during 1987 (6. juli Banken and C & G Banken), a willing acquirer could not be found and the banks were closed.
Deposit Insurance. Prior to 1988, Denmark maintained no official deposit-insurance system. Since that time, in compliance with European Community Directives, a deposit-insurance fund has been established, and banks contribute an annual insurance premium of two-tenths of 1% of their deposits. The insurance guarantee applies to deposits up to DKr 250,000 (currently about $37,000). When the C&G Banken failed soon after deposit insurance was established and was found to have negative net worth, the Danish government covered the resulting deficiency to small depositors. After that case (and through 1991), the Supervisory Authority intervened in 23 institutions because of capital deficiencies, but no government financial assistance was necessary to cover obligations to depositors.
The Danish Accounting System for Banks and Savings Banks

SUMMARY OF ACCOUNTING RULES
Accounting principles for banks, savings banks, and mortgage credit associations are established by the Danish Supervisory Authority. With the exceptions noted below, accounting is based on a mark-to-market approach for tax, financial reporting, and regulatory purposes.
Investment securities, including stocks and bonds, are accounted for at market value so long as the price is publicly quoted. Gains and losses affect both earnings and owners' equity. Unquoted securities (typically less than 10% of the investment portfolio) are carried at lower of cost or market.
Loan portfolios carry primarily variable rates, and thus the key deviation between the nominal loan portfolio balance and current market value arises from changes in credit risk. The Danish system requires a provision for loan losses that is sufficient to cover "both known and foreseeable losses." The regulations provide no explanation of this rule; those we interviewed-including representatives from auditing, banking, and the Supervisory Authority-interpreted the rule to indicate that the loan balance, net of provisions, should approximate current market value. In contrast, under U.S. GAAP (SFAS No. 5 on accounting for contingencies), loan losses need not be recognized until they are "probable." Also, until implementation of SFAS No. 114 (on loan impairments), and depending on how extensively banks applied the spirit of SFAS No. 15 (on troubled loan restructuring), U.S. GAAP did not necessarily require any loss recognition so long as undiscounted expected future cash flows exceed the loan principal.
In Denmark, there is essentially no secondary market for the loans carried by banks and savings banks, so dealer quotes for similar loans are not available. Furthermore, there is no required set of systematic procedures to estimate the provision for loan losses. Those we interviewed uniformly labeled the estimation process as subjective. Thus, the Danish system of accounting for loans is potentially more vulnerable to manipulation than objective approaches like those proposed by Berger, Kuester, and O'Brien [1990] . f For the small number of loans with fixed interest rates, the Danish rules require the recording of losses in value due to interest rate swings, but permit the recording of gains only to the extent that previous unrealized losses are offset.
Fixed assets typically represent only 1-2% of the total assets of a Danish bank. Land and buildings can be written up or down, based on government assessments, so long as the appreciation or depreciation is deemed to be of a permanent nature. Machinery and equipment is carried at depreciated cost.
Of-balance sheet assets and liabilities such as interest rate swaps, currency swaps, futures, and forward contracts are also marked to market, with gains and losses included as a component of earnings. Some of these off-balance sheet items are traded in active markets, and others (e.g., forward contracts) can be priced by reference to a combination of traded securities. In other cases, market values are based on dealers' quotes or must be estimated using discounted cash-flow techniques, option-pricing models, or other approaches. Liability accounts are not subject to mark-to-market accounting. However, two factors minimize the importance of this deviation from a comprehensive mark-to-market system. First, most liabilities (other than subordinated debt, which is considered capital) are short-term; hence, they are relatively unaffected by interest rate swings. Second, any unrealized gain or loss on swaps intended to hedge fixed-rate liabilities need not be recognized in earnings. Thus, for directly hedged positions, the accounting yields the same impact on earnings and owners' equity (no net gain or loss) as mark-to-market accounting for both assets and liabilities.
There is no attempt in the Danish system to account for intangible assets, such as a core-deposit premium, unless such intangibles are recorded as purchased goodwill.
To summarize, the accounting system used for Danish banks and savings banks marks to market the vast majority of banks' assets and offbalance sheet items. However, the accounting does differ from a comprehensive mark-to-market system, most importantly in that it ignores the value of internally developed intangible assets. Other deviations, including the failure to mark liabilities to market and the failure to record appreciation on fixed-rate loans due to interest rate declines, are less important given the structure of Danish banks, even though such deviations could be quite important in other contexts.
AUDITING OF DANISH BANKS AND SAVINGS BANKS
The above-described subjectivity in accounting for loan loss provisions suggests the potential for substantial management discretion. However, Danish banks and savings banks must be audited by at least two independent firms (who may share the scope of the audit). In addition, the internal audit staffs of banks and savings banks report directly to the board of directors, potentially offering another independent assessment of the accounts. Finally, the Supervisory Authority periodically conducts its own examinations. Thus, in principle, the financial statements are subject to audit by four independent parties. In addition, audit firms can be dismissed and replaced by the Supervisory Authority. Auditors are held directly responsible, along with management and the board of directors, for reporting difficulties (such as capital deficiencies) to the Authority.
Capital Ratios and Volatility Due to Mark-to-Market Adjustments
Given the strict enforcement of capital regulations in Denmark, if mark-to-market accounting increases earnings volatility, and that volatility can be offset only by costly changes in asset bases or frequent equity offerings, then banks may choose target capital levels well above the required minimum. In this section, we examine Danish bank capital ratios and the degree of volatility in those ratios due to mark-to-market adjustments.
In Table 2 , panel A describes the distribution of capital ratios (equity and subordinated debt, scaled by total liabilities excluding subordinated debt) for the full sample and the large-bank subsample for 1976-89. Within the full sample, capital ratios frequently exceed the required minimum 8%; nearly half of the observations fall above 11%, and more than a third fall above 12%. The mean of this skewed distribution is 17%. The six large banks maintain capital ratios closer to the minimum requirement; for these banks, the median (mean) ratio is 8.9 (9.1)% and nearly all observations fall below 11%. Table 2 , panel B indicates how two key mark-to-market accounting adjustments affect reported bank profitability. The first is the loan loss provision, which (at least in principle) represents a market-based adjustment for credit risk. The second is the so-called price adjustment, which reflects realized and unrealized gains and losses on investments, interest rate and currency swaps, and fixed-rate loans and mortgage deeds.13 Since the evidence in panel B requires a time series of reasonable length, we include only the fraction 57 banks with a complete series of data from 1976 through 1989. Table 2 , panel B indicates that, before considering the impact of the two primary mark-to-market adjustments and some other minor items, annual pretax earnings increase capital for the full sample by an average of 17.3%. To help assess how this pretax earnings number contributes to volatility in the capital ratio, table 2 reports that (on average across banks) the time-series standard deviation in pretax earnings is 5.1%.
Mark-to-market adjustments increase the earnings-induced volatility in capital. Price adjustments, with a mean effect of 6.4%, have an average standard deviation of 19.6% -nearly four times the standard deviation bNote that only a subset of the components of earnings before taxes are listed above this row. Thus, the means above this row are not intended to sum to the mean of earnings before taxes. of the pretax earnings before mark-to-market adjustments. Loan loss provisions have a mean effect of -7.5% and an average standard deviation of 6.5%. One would expect some offsetting of these effects; for example, rising interest income on variable rate loans and gains on certain hedges against rising interest rates (included in earnings before price 14 V. L. BERNARD, R. C. MERTON, AND K. G. PALEPU adjustments) would tend to coincide with losses on fixed-rate bonds (included among price adjustments). Thus, it is not surprising that the standard deviations fail to aggregate as if the components were independent. The average standard deviation in the sum of the components (i.e., total pretax earnings) is 17.4%, less than that for the price adjustments component. This indicates that interest rate exposure in the bond marketsthe primary driver of price adjustments-is important, but other components of earnings partially hedge that exposure.
After tax, earnings from all sources increase capital by 9.2% on average, with an average time-series standard deviation of 11.8%. To appreciate the significance of earnings volatility, it is necessary to consider its impact on the capital ratio (capital scaled by liabilities). Based on the empirical distribution for the full sample, the probability of a loss large enough to reduce the capital ratio by one percentage point is approximately 20%, and a bank with a ratio close to the median faces approximately a 2% probability of violating the 8% threshold, before considering any other effects. Table 2 , panel B also shows that the earnings-induced volatility in capital ratios is about two-thirds as large for the six large banks as for the full sample. Again, much of this volatility is due to price adjustments. The large banks' lower earnings volatility may partially explain their smaller "cushion" above the minimum capital requirements.
Overall, table 2 indicates that mark-to-market adjustments-particularly the price adjustments-contribute to earnings volatility for Danish banks. Whether this effect would be observed in other countries depends on both the extent of hedging and the completeness of the mark-to-market accounting. In the extreme case of comprehensive mark-to-market accounting for a bank that is perfectly hedged against interest-rate exposure, market value adjustments could offset not only each other, but also some earnings volatility before such adjustments. One implication from table 2 is that Danish banks do not use investments and off-balance-sheet positions to offset earnings volatility that arises from fluctuating rates on variable rate loans and deposits.
The low (less than 2%) probability of an annual loss large enough to cause violation of capital requirements for the average Danish bank may simply reflect the sizable equity cushions maintained by these banks. The costs of maintaining these cushions arise generally from mechanisms for dealing with conflicts of interest between guarantors and the guaranteed; it is not clear such costs represent an inefficiency, relative to other feasible approaches to managing a banking system.
Evidence of Manipulation of Market-Value Numbers by Danish Banks
The vulnerability of a mark-to-market accounting system to management manipulation reduces its value to a deposit-guarantee system. In this section, we examine the extent to which loan loss provisions and price adjustments appear to have been "managed" in Denmark. Our priors are that the loan loss provisions are more vulnerable to manipulation, due to the subjectivity of the estimation process. Much of the gain or loss reflected in the price adjustment is based on publicly observable market prices, and we expect it to be less vulnerable to manipulation.
While we would prefer to separate the discretionary and nondiscretionary components of mark-to-market adjustments (see Healy [1985] , Kaplan [1985] , and McNichols and Wilson [1988] for a discussion), there is little publicly available information that would facilitate such a segregation. For example, Danish banks do not provide data on nonperforming loans, or even the balance of loan loss allowances (loans are reported net of this amount). As a result, we use purely statistical procedures to isolate discretionary adjustments to earnings. The implication is a loss of power to identify manipulation, the magnitude of which is difficult to assess, and in the case of one set of tests to be discussed later, a bias in the same direction as manipulation.
A GENERAL TEST FOR "SMOOTHING" OF MARK-TO-MARKET ADJUSTMENTS
Our first set of tests examines the extent to which price adjustments and loan loss provisions are recognized only gradually. If asset prices follow a random walk, then successive price adjustments will be uncorrelated; but if managers smooth these price adjustments, the reported adjustments will be related over time. A similar logic applies for provisions. If provisions are sufficient for all known and foreseeable loan losses, as required by Danish law, then they should not be correlated over time. However, if managers adjust provisions only gradually when credit risks change, then provisions will be serially correlated.
We also test whether loan loss provisions and/or price adjustments are managed so as to offset each other and thus smooth reported income.14 There are several reasons income smoothing might be desired. For tax purposes, Danish managers have an incentive to minimize current earnings, subject to maintaining the required level of capital. Assuming a smooth pattern of dividends and a steady level of required capital, that objective can be met by smoothing income. Managers may also be concerned about adverse investor reaction to earnings volatility.
The tests are conducted in two ways. First, we aggregate the banks into a single group, and examine the resulting time series of 14 observations (1976-89) to test for industry-wide manipulation of mark-to-market adjustments. The second approach is based on pooled regressions and focuses on firm-specific manipulation. In the pooled regressions, a fixedeffect error-term formulation is adopted, under which the error term is 14 Scholes, Wilson, and Wolfson [1990] show that, for a sample of U.S. banks, loan loss provisions seem to be managed to offset gains/losses on security sales. Beatty, Chamberlain, and Magliolo [1994] report other forms of income management by banks. assumed to contain a time-invariant, firm-specific effect (e.g., ali for loan loss provisions), a sample-wide, yearly effect (e.g., a2t for loan loss provisions), and a random disturbance (e.g., 8it). This is equivalent to expressing all data as deviations from the associated firm and year effects (e.g., ali + a2t) (see Judge et al. [1980, p. 330] ). As a result, these tests can detect whether banks are managing "abnormal" provisions or price adjustments-those that deviate from current industry experience and the long-run average experience for the given bank. If these benchmarks are largely beyond management control, then the pooled regressions should isolate the discretionary component of the mark-tomarket adjustments within the "abnormal" deviations.
The pooled regressions based on firm-specific data take on the following forms: 
a(li, 1li, and yli = firm-specific components of error terms; a2t, P2t, and 72t = year-specific components of error terms; LLPitlLoansit = loan loss provisions for firm i in year t, scaled by total loans; PAdjitlAssetsit = price adjustments for firm i in year t, scaled by total assets.'5
The time-series regressions based on industry data contain the same variables as the pooled regressions, but with no firm or year dummies in the error structure. When equations (1) through (3) are estimated with pooled time-series cross-sectional data, there is a potential for bias in standard error estimates resulting from both cross-sectional heteroscedasticity and crosssectional dependence that remains after controlling for industry-wide shifts in the data (see Bernard [1987] ). For that reason, we report an alternative set of estimates in which we allow the slope coefficients to vary by year, and then report the mean of the series of annual co-15 Ideally, we would scale price adjustments by the balances subject to the adjustments. Thus, instead of using total assets, we would exclude cash, equipment, and variable rate loans, while including some off-balance-sheet items. The data necessary to achieve this ideal are not available from our source, however, and amounts of variable rate loans and some of the desired off-balance-sheet data are not available even from the original Danish financial statements. Thus, the analysis assumes that total assets are a good indicator of the ideal measure. If the assumption is incorrect, we forfeit efficiency but have no reason to suspect bias. efficients.16 The standard deviation of that time series provides the basis for the associated t-test.17 'While this alternative test is free from bias in standard errors due to cross-sectional heteroscedasticity or dependence, it may forfeit some statistical efficiency by placing equal weight on the coefficient estimates from each year. In the pooled regressions, the influence of each year's data depends on the dispersion in the regressors and the sample size. Table 3 reports the results of the tests.'8 In the time-series regressions, with only 14 annual observations, there is limited power to detect serial correlation. Nevertheless, so far as loan loss provisions are concerned, we still find reliably positive serial correlation in the full sample. For price adjustments, we find no significant serial correlation, and thus no indication of manipulation.
The time-series estimates on the right-hand side of table 3 indicate that, consistent with income smoothing, approximately one-third of the variation in price adjustments is offset by variation in loan loss provisions. Although we can imagine economic conditions that would induce such an effect, we would not necessarily expect this effect in the absence of manipulation. That is, we would not necessarily expect positive price adjustments (driven largely by falling interest rates and resulting gains in the bond market) to occur simultaneously with higher loan losses (driven largely by rising credit risks).
The results of the pooled cross-sectional regressions generally corroborate those from the time-series regressions. We find no significant serial correlation in price adjustments for either sample, and significant correlation for the loan loss provisions for the full sample only. The latter result suggests that when a bank's expected loan losses deviate from their average level relative to the current industry-wide experience and the banks' long-run average experience, the bank recognizes such losses only gradually. The regression estimate of .30 suggests that a recorded loss of DKr 1 tends to be followed by another recorded loss of DKr .30 in the subsequent year, of DKr .09 two years hence, and so on. The implication is that about 70% of the expected loss is recognized immediately.
For comparison purposes, table 3 also includes pooled-regression results (based on equation (1) The final result in table 3 is the pooled regression that examines the contemporaneous relation between loan loss provisions and price adjustments. These regressions indicate a significant degree of offsetting of the two mark-to-market adjustments in the firm-specific data. For the sample of large banks, the estimates suggest that 86% of the variation in price adjustments is offset by variation in loan loss provisions. For the full sample, the magnitude of the effect is only 5% or 11%, depending on the estimation approach, and is not statistically significant when we use the t-test free from bias due to cross-sectional heteroscedasticity and dependence.
The contemporary relation between loan loss provisions and price adjustments found for the large banks could reflect manipulation of either or both numbers. However, given the subjective nature of the loan loss estimates and the fact that much of the price adjustment is driven by gains and losses on publicly traded bonds, a likely explanation is that loan loss estimates are managed by the large banks so as to "smooth" the impact on income of the price adjustments.20
MANIPULATION OF MARK-TO-MARKET ADJUSTMENTS TO MEET CAPITAL
REQUIREMENTS
In this section we report evidence on whether loan loss provisions and price adjustments are manipulated to avoid violations of capital requirements. The tests are intended to isolate the discretionary components of provisions and price adjustments, and then to compare them across three groups of low, medium, and high capital ratios (calculated as capital as a percentage of total liabilities) prior to estimated discretionary accruals (calculated as explained below).21 The low category includes those banks with ratios less than 9% (the ones closest to the 8% minimum capital requirement); the medium category consists of banks with capital ratios between 9% and 11%; the high category consists of 20 The most direct approach to testing for earnings smoothing earnings would be to examine whether loan loss provisions and/or price adjustments offset the variation in earnings before these adjustments. However, such tests are difficult to interpret, because there are sound economic reasons to expect some offsetting even in the absence of earnings management (or that the offsetting effects due to earnings management could be masked to estimated discretionary loan loss provisions and price adjustments, the capital ratio for firm i in year t is low (< 9%), medium (9 to 11%), or high (> 11%), respectively.
Regression models (4), (5), and (6) each include a fixed-effect error structure like that used in models (1), (2), and (3). For example, equation (4) assumes that the error term includes a firm-specific component (ili)g a sample-wide, year-specific component (2t), and a random component (fit). Under the assumption that the nondiscretionary portions of loan loss provisions include only year-specific and firm-specific effects, they are captured in the term ('iIi + r92t). Any remaining systematic variation across the capital ratio categories (i.e., that reflected by the coefficients (61, 62, and 63)) must be due to discretionary accruals.
The above discussion pertains to isolation of the discretionary component of the dependent variable. Segregation of discretionary from nondiscretionary accruals is also an issue for the right-hand-side variables that assign banks to low, medium, or high categories of capital ratios. Ideally, we would classify firms on the basis of their capital ratios without 22As discussed later in this section, we perform sensitivity analysis to test the robustness of the results with respect to this classification. the effects of discretionary accruals.23 To that end, we adjust the reported capital ratios by removing the effect of the year's total loan loss provisions and price adjustments on a net-of-tax basis, and then substituting the effect of an estimated net-of-tax nondiscretionary provision and price adjustment. The estimated nondiscretionary portion of each accrual is (when scaled by loans or assets) equal to the scaled sample mean for the year, plus a mean firm effect equal to the amount by which a bank's scaled mean over all years differs from the grand scaled mean.24 The marginal tax rate is estimated at .50, the statutory tax rate in Denmark throughout our test period. This process of adjusting the right-hand-side variables is consistent with the previously described approach to controlling for the nondiscretionary component of the dependent variables, except that it is done on a net-of-tax basis.
Error in our measures of discretionary accruals tends to increase the standard errors of our coefficients, thus reducing the power to detect manipulations. At the same time, because the estimated discretionary component isolated from the dependent variable is proportional to the estimated component removed from the capital ratios underlying the right-hand-side dummy variables, the measurement error also induces coefficient bias that works in favor of a finding of manipulation.25 Unfortunately, as indicated earlier, data limitations preclude a cleaner approach.
Since cross-sectional dependence is a potential concern in the pooled regressions, we again supply (as in table 3) alternative estimates and t-statistics based on time-series standard errors for the full sample. 23 The desirability of modeling discretionary accruals as a function of right-hand-side variables not influenced by the discretion has long been recognized (see Healy [1985] ), but some prior studies have relied on alternative procedures. Stinson [1992] models discretionary accruals for U.S. thrifts as a function of reported capital ratios, by assuming that those most likely to have manipulated earnings are the ones whose reported ratios barely achieve the required minimum. Moyer [1990] models discretionary accruals for U.S. banks as a function of reported capital ratios, relative to the required minimum.
24 For example, if loan losses are 1.5% of loans for the full sample in a given year, and bankA tends to have loan losses 0.5% higher than the sample-wide average, the nondiscretionary loan loss provision for bank A in that year would be estimated at 2.0% of loans. For purposes of assigning bank A to a high, medium, or low capital category, capital would be adjusted so as to reflect a provision of 2.0% of loans (net of an estimated 50% tax effect), instead of the actual provision. The same approach would also be applied to price adjustments.
25.To illustrate, assume a nondiscretionary positive price adjustment by one bank is misclassified as discretionary. This gain will remain in that portion of the dependent variable to be allocated to one of the three capital ratio categories, thus biasing upward at least one of the three associated coefficients. At the same time, since the gain is mistakenly considered discretionary, its net-of-tax effect is removed from capital before assigning the firm to a capital ratio category; this would tend to place the bank in too low a category. The upshot is a tendency to bias upward the coefficient on lower capital ratio categories-thus producing a result consistent with weaker banks manipulating their price adjustments upward. A bias consistent with manipulation also arises when loan loss provisions are misclassified.
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Tests for Manipulation of Loan Loss Provisions. Panel A of table 4 reports the results of tests for manipulation of loan loss provisions to avoid regulatory capital constraints. For the sample of six large banks, we test for a difference only between the low and medium capital-ratio categories, since there was but one observation in the high category. The mean ratio of loan loss provisions to loans is 1.07% for the low category, insignificantly higher than the .96% mean for the medium category. Thus, there is no indication of manipulation for this group of large banks.
For the full sample of banks, the provisions/loans ratio increases slightly across the low, medium, and high capital-ratio categories, from 1.51%, to 1.52%, to 1.53% based on the first estimation approach, and from 1.39%, to 1.51%, to 1.55% based on the alternative estimation approach. While this pattern is consistent with downward manipulation of loan loss provisions for banks closest to the regulatory capital constraint, differences among categories are not statistically significant.
Although the regulatory capital requirement for our sample was 8%, we included banks with ratios up to 9% in the low category, increasing the number of observations in that cell from 82 to 221 in an effort to increase statistical power. Perhaps, however, only the banks below the 8% regulatory requirement have strong incentives to manipulate mark-tomarket adjustments. To assess this possibility, we repeated the analysis with an 8% cutoff (results not reported) and found no reliable indications of manipulation.26 In fact, the low-category banks in the full sample actually recorded larger loan loss provisions than the medium category or the high category. For the subsample of six large banks, the loan loss provisions were also (insignificantly) larger for the low category.
These results based on Danish data can be compared to others for U.S. banks and thrifts. Evidence for U.S. banks in Moyer [1990] and Beatty, Chamberlain, and Magliolo [1994] , as well as Stinson's [1992] evidence on U.S. thrifts, indicates that loan loss provisions are manipulated by institutions close to the regulatory capital requirement, in a direction consistent with increasing reported capital. While precise comparisons cannot be made (in part because of possible differences in the power of the tests), the evidence is consistent with the hypothesis that manipulating loan losses to avoid regulatory capital constraints is more prevalent in the United States than in Denmark.
Tests for Manipulation of Price Adjustments. Evidence on the relation between capital ratios and price adjustments (panel B of table 4) indicates that gains on price adjustments are higher for the more poorly capitalized banks, consistent with manipulation. However, only the results from the full-sample pooled regression, where bias in standard (5), and (6) in text.) The regression disturbances are assumed to consist of a fixed effect that varies across time, a second fixed effect that varies across firms, and a random disturbance term. Amounts reported above represent the mean of the sample-wide fixed effects (for both years and firms), adjusted for the deviation about that mean for the given capital-ratio category. bNot applicable. The few observations in this cell were included within the category labeled as 9-11%. cTotal mark-to-market accruals consist of price adjustments minus loan loss provisions, both scaled by total assets.
errors is a concern, indicate significant differences between groups; the comparable t-statistics based on time-series standard errors are not close to achieving significance. Table 4 , panel C presents the results of tests for the sum of loan loss provisions and price adjustments, scaled by total assets. Since the price adjustments are more variable than the loan loss provisions, the results are similar to those based on price adjustments alone. There is a significantly lower combined accrual for the medium and high capital ratio banks when the full sample is analyzed with the pooled regression, but not otherwise. For the reasons discussed above, we hesitate to rely on the full-sample pooled regressions. We find no significant differences across the groups when we rely on the timeseries t-test that is relatively free of bias in standard errors.
SUMMARY OF TESTS FOR MANIPULATION OF MARK-TO-MARKET ADJUSTMENTS
Our tests yield no reliable evidence that price adjustments are manipulated by Danish banks. This result is expected, because price adjustments are largely determined by publicly observable market prices. For the other major mark-to-market adjustment-loan loss provisions-we find some mixed evidence of manipulation. Specifically, as in the U.S. system, discretionary loan loss provisions of Danish banks are serially correlated (but only in the full sample), consistent with a gradual recognition of the effects of changes in market values. For the subsample of six large banks, there is also evidence that loan loss provisions are managed to offset the impact of price adjustments and thus dampen the volatility of earnings. However, the key regulatory concern is that managers might manipulate loan loss provisions to avoid capital deficiencies and the associated government intervention. On this score, our tests produce no reliable evidence of manipulation.
Evidence on "Noise" in Mark-to-Market Numbers, Based on Comparisons with Stock Prices
We argued earlier that an ideal accounting system for a depositguarantee system produces an independently verifiable net-asset balance representing the "bid" obtainable from external parties in an orderly sale or liquidation. In such a system, the book value of net assets would differ from the institution's stock price for only two reasons. First, the stock price but not the net assets would include the value of the option to "put" the deposits to the guarantee system (Merton [1977] ).27 Second, an ideal accounting system would reflect values based on information that could be revealed to and verified by an auditor, even though the stock market might not yet recognize such values.
In practice, large deviations could also arise in a market-to-market system between net asset values and stock prices because of perceived manager manipulation of accounting, or incompleteness in the markto-market system. In the Danish system, for example, there is no attempt to measure the current market value of intangible assets such as core deposits.
Here, we assess the importance of "noise" in mark-to-market accounting numbers by comparing mark-to-market net asset values with stock prices.28 The approach relies on the assumption that deviations of net asset values from stock prices caused by the put option and information asymmetry between managers/auditors and investors would be relatively small.2 Under that assumption, the ratio of stock prices to book values from the ideal mark-to-market accounting system would be close to one. Deviations from one indicate imperfections in the mark-to-market system.
We examine market-to-book ratios for both Danish banks and U.S. banks and thrifts. Given that U.S. banks and thrifts do not attempt to reflect current market values in their accounting systems, one would expect large deviations from one in their market-to-book ratios. However, given that both systems ignore the value of important intangible assets, and both systems are subject to manipulation, it is not immediately obvious that market-to-book ratios would be more tightly distributed around one in Denmark. We would prefer to compare the U.S. ratios with Danish ratios calculated with and without mark-to-market 27 Note that since the value of this put option increases with the riskiness of the institution, including it in regulatory capital would encourage the institution to increase exposure to risk; this is one of the reasons stock prices would be poor measures of capital in a deposit-insurance system. 28A critical assumption in our analysis is that U.S. and Danish stock markets are efficient, and that Danish investors gain access to information beyond the financial statements, so that they need not base prices only on book values. There is substantial evidence on the efficiency of U.S. stock markets; we are, however, unaware of any systematic research on the efficiency of the Danish stock market. The evidence on market-to-book ratios becomes difficult to interpret if the Danish market is not efficient.
29A partial test of the assumption that the put option value has little impact on market/book ratios was conducted by examining U.S. thrifts, which include poorly capitalized institutions for whom the put option value was most likely to be large. If the put option value is important, then the market/book ratio should be higher and more variable for thrifts with low capital ratios. However, the market/book ratio for that half of the sample with the lowest capital ratios was actually lower in each year, and the standard deviation was lower in five of eight years-consistent with a small put option value relative to other factors that affect market/book ratios. a grand mean of 1.28; annual means for the U.S. thrifts range from .40  to 1.34, with a grand mean of .85 . The means are significantly different from one in most years for each sample. While these differences probably reflect the failure of both accounting systems to record the value of intangibles, the differences in the United States perhaps also reflect a failure to record existing assets and liabilities at market values. Such a failure is also a possibility in the Danish data, to the extent that the mark-to-market numbers are manipulated.
Perhaps the most interesting finding in Under our assumptions, the greater dispersion in market-to-book ratios in the United States can arise because the current value of unrecorded intangibles is more variable in the United States than in Denmark and/or recorded book values deviate from externally perceived market values more in the United States than in Denmark. The first source of dispersion is not due to the accounting system, but the second represents dispersion that the Danish system is intended to mitigate or eliminate. Given the absence of data on unrecorded intangibles, it is impossible to separate these two possibilities. However, to the extent that the second reason plays any material role, the findings suggest that the mark-to-market accounting numbers in Denmark contain less noise as indicators of the value of recorded assets than the historical accounting numbers in the United States. This conclusion goes against the hypothesis that the subjectivity involved in mark-to-market accounting produces even noisier measures of value than a historical-cost system.
The Danish Experience with Regulatory Intervention
Several of the key questions about mark-to-market accounting concern its impact on the cost of resolving capital deficiencies. From 1985 through 1990, 9 banks and 16 mutual savings banks in Denmark experienced capital deficiencies that gave rise to government intervention. Table 6 lists the 9 banks subject to intervention. Since those banks were publicly traded, it is possible to compare the proceeds (if any) received by owners at the time of intervention to the final reported book value of each failed institution. (The acquirers of the 16 failed mutual savings banks paid for such acquisitions in the form of cash infusions to trusts for depositors, but the amounts of the infusions are not available.) The first lesson to be drawn from table 6 concerns the costs of early regulatory intervention. Recall that Seidman [1991] estimates that the mere act of government intervention in the United States may destroy as much as 15% of the value of a financial institution's assets. An alternative explanation is that intervention precipitates recognition of market-value losses not yet apparent in the U.S. historical-cost accounting system. The experience with the Danish system provides an opportunity to discriminate between these two possibilities.
Danish bankers and regulators we interviewed indicated that not only were 23 of 25 failed banks and savings banks sold at a positive price, but in most cases they were sold at a premium over book value. For the seven banks sold, data are available in five cases, and as shown in table 6, each was sold at a premium to book value.30 Unless the preintervention values of these failed banks were even higher, the data suggest that regulatory intervention need not destroy significant value, and that Seidman's [1991] estimated cost of intervention may simply reflect (at least in part) the U.S. accounting system's lag in recognizing value changes.31 Table 6 also provides evidence corroborating the previous finding that mark-to-market accounting numbers are not manipulated to avoid regulatory intervention. Acquisitions at a premium over book value suggest that the book values are not significantly overstated at the time of intervention. On the contrary, if the premia reflect unrecorded intangible assets of the failed banks, as opposed to synergies, the evidence suggests that incompleteness in the Danish accounting system causes book values to be downward-biased indicators of market value.
Given that only one of the 25 cases of regulatory intervention involved government financial assistance, the costs of dealing with capital deficiencies in Denmark appear low, especially relative to the U.S. experience. One might argue that Denmark has avoided such costs by acting too quickly, requiring takeovers of banks that could have survived without intervention. However, given that the owners of the failed banks chose to forego the option to remedy the capital deficiency through cash infusions, and instead sold their shares to acquiring firms, the evidence does not suggest that the interventions were costly and premature.32
Summary and Lessons for the United States
This paper examines the Danish experience with mark-to-market accounting for banks to help resolve some of the questions raised as the United States considers the merits of such a system for financial institutions.
Our first result concerns the reliability of mark-to-market accounting systems, particularly their susceptibility to management manipulation. We find no compelling evidence in the Danish system that price adjustments, which include the major realized and unrealized gains and losses on investments and some off-balance sheet positions, are manipulated. We do find evidence of a gradual recognition of loan losses, similar to that documented for the U.S. banking sector. This result provides justification for the concern that mark-to-market accounting for loans in Denmark does not entirely overcome managers' tendency to delay reporting of credit risks. Nevertheless, on the key question of whether the mark-to-market accounting system is managed to avoid regulatory intervention, our tests produce no reliable affirmative evidence. 31 In principle, another possibility is that book values increased substantially after the final report but prior to acquisition. While we have no data to refute this possibility, our discussions with the Danes cast extreme doubt on it.
32 It would be interesting for future research to compare the performance of the Danish banking system with the performance of the banking systems in Norway and Sweden. The three countries have closely related economies and all of them have experienced economic downturns in the past few years. However, only Danish regulations use a markto-market accounting system.
